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Of course, it appears unfriendly to make a contribution "against" the person
who is to be honored. But when George P. Fletcher wrote his editorial comment
"Against Universal Jurisdiction,"1 he expressed the hope that someone would
carry forth the dialogue by responding. Here is a response in terms of a plea "for
universal jurisdiction" to show that most of his antagonism is to be rejected. My
criticism of his anti-universality position will not be completely new to him,
however, since we already had some discussion on our contrary views when jointly
giving a course on international criminal law at Columbia Law School in 2003.
Therefore, I am confident that our mutual respect and long-lasting friendship will
be strengthened rather than weakened by this controversy.
I. SETFING THE TUNE
If one is a sensitive person, one may already feel affected by Fletcher's
opening characterization of those who "favour universal jurisdiction for serious
crimes of cruelty and violence",2 as "compassionate 'right-thinking' lawyers of the
world"a-as if these people are led more by sentiment than by reason, as if in their
self-righteous conviction of knowing what is good for mankind and the world, they
seem to relate with outer space more than with earthly realities.
As a supporter of universal jurisdiction, I must confess not to feel amused by
finding myself put in the corner of passionate but brainless "good people."
Nevertheless I could live with this prejudice if Fletcher recognized that universal
jurisdiction-at least at its true core-is thought of as a way to secure the
prosecution of crimes against universally recognized values even in cases in which
states with primary jurisdictions (such as the state of the territory where the crime
was committed or the state the accused is a national of) do not function properly.4
* Dr. iur., Dr. h. c. mult., M.C.J., Professor Emeritus of Albert Ludwigs University Freiburg,
former Director of the Max Planck Institute for Foreign International and Criminal Law. For
constructive criticism and assistance, particularly for collecting material on "double jeopardy," I am
greatly indebted to Christoph Burchard, research fellow at the Max Planck Institute.
1. George P. Fletcher, Against Universal Jurisdiction, 1 J. Intl. Crim. Just. 580, 580 (2003).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. There are, of course, more facets of "universal jurisdiction" than can be briefly described in this
analysis. For the variety of approaches, see A. Hays Butler, The Doctrine of Universal Jurisdiction: A
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Calling supporters of this proposition "compassionate 'right-thinking' lawyers"
would come close to an insult, however, if it were to imply that a person
committed to universal jurisdiction would readily disregard sacred principles and
standards of ordinary criminal justice. Now, whatever Fletcher wanted to hint at
with his dubious comment, he leaves no doubt that in his eyes "universal
jurisdiction is both unwise and unjust."5
When turning to the reasons he propounds for his position, it might appear
proper to follow his line of arguments. Although this will be done to a certain
extent, some variations seem appropriate, partly because Fletcher himself takes up
similar arguments at different stages (as he does, for instance, with questions of
double jeopardy), arguments will here rather be addressed at one place, and partly
because he evaluates the interests of the defendant and the victim (as well as other
parties involved in the criminal justice system) from a perspectivedifferent from
that preferred here. Another difficulty of following his reasoning lies in the fact
that it is not always clear whether he speaks of universal jurisdiction in terms of a
general principle (with possible variations in one way or another) or of universal
jurisdiction as it is regulated on the national level (in domestic penal codes) and/or
on a supranational level (as, in particular, by the Rome Statute for the
International Criminal Court6). Nevertheless, I shall try my best to do justice to
his propositions, be it in this or in that context.
II. AMBIVALENT CONCEPTIONS OF UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION
No doubt, the opening of Fletcher's plea against universal jurisdiction may
impress some by recalling that "many are outraged by Belgian, Canadian, German
and other claims to have the right to judge crimes no matter where they are
committed"7 and by reminding us of "some unseemly threats of retaliation, 8 by
officials in the Bush administration "if Belgium refuses to draw in its net of
asserted jurisdiction."9 Before coming to the propositions and implications of this
statement, I must first express astonishment about the timing of such excitement.
Universal jurisdiction has been recognized, if not as an international mandate,
then at least in terms of being empowered to proscribe, for many decades, as
Review of the Literature, 11 Crim. L. Forum 353 (2000). As to my own view on universal jurisdiction so
far, see Albin Eser, Harmonisierte Universalitat nationaler Strafgewalt: ein Desiderat internationaler
Komplementaritat bei Verfolgung von Volkerrechtsverbrechen, in Strafrecht, Strafprozessrecht und
Menschenrechte: Festschrift fPr Stefan Trechsel zum 65. Geburtstag 219 (Andreas Donatsch, Marc
Forster & Christian Schwarzenegger eds., Schulthess 2002) [hereinafter Eser, Harmonisierte
Universalitit]; Albin Eser, National Jurisdiction over Extraterritorial Crimes within the Framework of
International Complementarity: A Comparative Survey on Transnational Prosecution of Genocide
According to the Principle of Universality, in Man's Inhumanity to Man: Essays on International Law in
Honour of Antonio Cassese 279 (Lal Chand Vohrah et al. eds., Kluwer L. Intl. 2003) [hereinafter Eser,
National Jurisdiction].
5. Fletcher, supra n. 1, at 580.
6. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF. 183/9 (July 17,
1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute].
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evidenced by the famous Lotus'° case of 1927. Even more remarkably, many
infamous criminals would not have been tried and convicted if not-at least in an
auxiliary way-for the principle of universal jurisdiction. Consider two examples:
the trial of German war criminals after World War II by the International Military
Tribunal of Nuremberg 8 and the trial of Adolf Eichmann by the Israeli Supreme
Court.9 In both instances it is very doubtful that Germany, the jurisdiction where
the relevant crimes had been committed, would have been willing to put the
criminals on trial and to punish them in a way which would have been considered
just worldwide. That means, without taking resort to the principle of universality
these crimes might have remained unpunished.
This basic fact seems to be overlooked by Fletcher when, in connection with
the Eichmann case, he argues against universal jurisdiction using the example of
Argentina." Even if he is right in assuming that Argentina (as the long term
domicile of Eichmann) could have claimed universal jurisdiction and ended up
with an acquittal, this is not an apt argument against universal jurisdiction as such;
rather this only points to a general pitfall of international or transnational criminal
law, that of concurrent (national and/or international) jurisdictions. When the
state of the commission of the crime claims territorial jurisdiction and the state the
defendant is a citizen of asserts jurisdiction based on the nationality principle, it
can easily come to pass that one is driving at a conviction and the other at an
acquittal. Although these are certainly serious inter-jurisdictional conflicts which
deserve to be dealt with separately, and in particular with regard to "ne bis in
idem ,12 concurrencies of this sort are not peculiar to universal jurisdiction.
Rather, they are common for all combinations of different principles for applying
national criminal law to extraterritorial crimes.13 And this, by the way, would be
true even if all jurisdictions of the world restricted themselves to the principle of
territoriality; for even within such a seemingly clear-cut territorial demarcation it
may happen that a criminal act was started in one country, continued in a second,
and finally effected in a third, and that-on the basis of "ubiquity" (as this
principle is called in European continental tradition), 4 or the common law terms
of "objective" and "subjective" territoriality, or the new American paradigm of
"defensive territoriality"'"- each state concerned claims jurisdiction, though
perhaps for different ends.
10. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 20 (Judgment No. 9 of Sept. 7); see generally
Christopher L. Blakesley, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, in International Criminal Law vol. 2, 33, 45-47
(M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2d ed., Transnatl. Publishers 1999).
11. Fletcher, supra n. 1, at 583.
12. See infra pts. V & VIII.
13. Eser, National Jurisdiction, supra n. 4, at 280-84. For a broad survey on concurrent jurisdictions
that is both historical and comparative, see generally Christopher L. Blakesley & Otto Lagodny,
Competing National Laws: Network or Jungle?, in Principles and Procedures for a New Transnational
Criminal Law 47 (Albin Eser & Otto Lagodny eds., Eigenverlag Max-Planck-Institut 1992); Blakesley,
supra n. 10, at 33-36.
14. Blakesley & Lagodny, supra n. 13, at 49.
15. Ellen S. Podgor, "Defensive Territoriality": A New Paradigm for the Prosecution of
Extraterritorial Business Crimes, 31 Ga. J. Intl. & Comp. L. 1 (2002).
2004]
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Thus, Fletcher may rightly complain about the risks of concurrent
jurisdictions; nevertheless, he should refrain from attributing them solely to
universal jurisdiction. Even when national jurisdictions are concurring on the
basis of classical links, such as territoriality or nationality of the offender or victim,
this can result in international conflicts. In order to solve them, it would be hardly
imaginable to abandon all classical principles for the application of national law to
extraterritorial crimes altogether, rather than to resolve the concurrence problem
by rules of conflict. In the same way, the principle of universality must not totally
be abolished, but should rather be "tamed," as will be shown later.16 For
otherwise, crimes against universally recognized values (crimes like genocide,
crimes against humanity, and war crimes)-particularly if committed or supported
by a state's agents against own co-citizens and therefore not prosecuted by the
state concerned-would remain unpunished. This category would include the
terrible crimes of Eichmann and the war criminals of Nuremberg-a result hardly
reconcilable with true justice.
So why now the outcry against universal jurisdiction, as proclaimed by
Fletcher? Two explanations seem at hand. A more pragmatic one could be found
in states' traditional loathness with regard to crimes they are not directly
concerned by, and this even more so when the exercise of jurisdiction would
create the risk of conflicting with another state's sovereignty interests. So in order
to avoid both investigatory efforts and international troubles, even countries
whose laws already allowed them to exercise universal jurisdiction to prosecute
crimes against universally recognized interests-such as Belgium, Germany, and
Spain-refrained from exercising this power for a long time.17 Consequently, there
was no reason for opponents of universal jurisdiction to get excited.
The level of acquiescence with the rather broad universal powers already in
the books changed dramatically when various countries started to become more
and more aware of the need to safeguard universal values and to not leave their
criminal violation unpunished. And even if this may have been an unconscious
process, as described by Cassese, universal jurisdiction was now no longer merely
conceived of as a "joint concern of all [s]tates18 in terms of protecting their own
interests and at the same time those of other states. Rather, universal jurisdiction
was now seen as authorization for states to act as "universal guardians" in that it
allowed any state, without regard for its own concerns, "to substitute itself for the
natural judicial forum, namely the territorial or national State, should neither of
them bring proceedings against the alleged author of an international crime."19
Thus, in fact, it was nothing else than taking this "supranational" responsibility
seriously when Germany initiated the prosecution of a Serb who, except for
having immigrated, had no other ties with the country, and who after his deferral
to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
16. Infra pt. VIII.
17. See Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law 286-98 (Oxford U. Press 2003).
18. Id. at 284.
19. Id. at 284-85.
[Vol. 39:955
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happened to become that court's first convict, ° or when Spain requested that the
United Kingdom extradite the former President of Chile. So when it became
apparent that these jurisdictions were seriously determined to bring the universal
powers in their penal codes to life, it was time for skeptics to wake up.
Yet, there could be a still more delicate explanation for the fact that
universal jurisdiction in the aforementioned postwar cases was almost universally
accepted, while the modern Belgian, Canadian, and German claims of universal
jurisdiction have caused the outrage described by Fletcher. If universal
jurisdiction was welcome in former times,why should it be rebutted from the very
outset when politicians of our time and political sphere are charged with an
international crime and effectively prosecuted by way of universal jurisdiction
when the territorial or national state fails to do so? Only because one class of
suspects appears closer to us and less abhorrent than the other? But would this be
reconcilable with impartiality and the presumption of innocence, which is
guaranteed to the ones no less than to the others?
III. IMPUNIDAD, FAIRNESS, AND "IMPERFECT JUSTICE"
Maybe Fletcher would counter my proposition to prosecute suspects of
international crimes with unbiased determination and on equal terms by
21
suggesting that justice should remain "imperfect" rather than being unfair.
D'accord if he meant to say that there is no justice without fairness. I am not sure,
however, whether this plain truism is really what he had in mind. My doubts arise
from the observation that Fletcher is using the keywords of impunidad, justice,
and fairness in an ambiguous way or from perspectives not at all common.
So just to give some examples, Fletcher, on the one hand, calls universal
jurisdiction "unjust,, 22 and on the other hand, purports that "justice is
imperfect., 23 I guess that these contradictory pronouncements may be reconciled
with each other by assuming that in these two sentences "justice" is not meant in
the same sense. Whereas universal jurisdiction is denounced as "unjust" since
performed at the cost of fair prosecution; "imperfect justice" is welcome for
ensuring fair trials, even if deliberately letting some guilty offenders go free.24
While in the context of universal jurisdiction "unjustness" is obviously meant in
terms of lack of fair trial (thus equating justice and fairness), in the other context
fairness of the trial appears opposed to justice in terms of punishment, thus
confronting procedural fairness (toward the accused) with punishment (asked for
by the victim and the people).
20. Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, 1997 ICTY IT-94-1. On the German decision to extradite Tadic, see
generally Kai Ambos & Guido Ruegenberg, Internationale Rechtsprechung zum Straf- und
Strafverfahrensrecht, 3 NStZ - Rechtsprechungs-Report (NStZ-RR) 161, 168 (1998).
21. See Fletcher, supra n. 1, at 581.
22. Id. at 580.
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This second understanding of justice-eventually even in terms of
retribution-seems to be present when Fletcher speaks of victims "clamour[ing]
not for fair trials for the accused but primarily for justice for themselves," 25 or
when he contends that "[a]nything short of perfect justice is called impunidad.26
Although it would be interesting to know who is making the last contention,
Fletcher's supposition is patent: in his eyes, the determination in the Preamble of
the Rome Statute "to put an end to impunity" means that "impunidad has become
one of the evils of our time: the failure to prosecute serious crimes is considered as
bad if not worse than the crime itself., 27 Although he does not tell who assumes
such an extreme position, at any rate he thus equates justice with unconditional
punishment. So in the end he seems to consider (the search for) justice as siding
with the victim and (the ensuring of) fairness as siding with the accused.
This exposition provokes some questions with regard to universal
jurisdiction:
* When justice is equated with the punishment of guilty offenders, how
then can the aim of universal jurisdiction to prevent impunity of
international crimes be "unjust"?
* Why are victims supposed to clamor not for fairness but merely for
justice in terms of retribution or even revenge?
* Why shall fairness only be owed to the offender and not to victims as
well?
As these and similar points will also be considered in other contexts, only a
more basic issue may be addressed here: the repetitious invocation, if not praise,
of "imperfect justice." In addition to the instances already mentioned, Fletcher
criticizes the Rome Statute for its aim of "ensuring prosecution to prevent gaps
and impunidad"28 and not of seeking the opposite result in terms of "imperfect
justice" as created by the constitutional protection of the accused.29 Yet, not only
do I have sincere doubts whether the Rome Statute may fairly be interpreted as
intentionally sacrificing the rights of the accused for preventing impunity at any
cost, 30 I am even more irritated by Fletcher's subliminal confusion of the
"imperfectness" of justice as a deplorable fact and "imperfect justice" as a
normative maxim, if not end. Of course, the administration of justice as a human
enterprise can never be perfect, either in terms of substantive justice (by punishing
all crimes equally), or in terms of procedural justice (by granting equal fairness to
all parties concerned by a criminal proceeding, especially by treating the
defendant in a fair and impartial manner). In this respect any balancing of
contrary interests, as they are unavoidable in the administration of justice, will
25. Id.
26. Fletcher, supra n. 1, at 581.
27. Id. at 580.
28. Id. at 582.
29. Id.
30. See infra pt. IV, including accompanying text at note 38.
[Vol. 39:955
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leave some injustice as an unwanted side effect. This must not mean, however,
that justice may be "imperfect" by purpose: even if we will never reach "perfect
justice," at least the search for it remains part of justice.
IV. DUE PROCESS: PROCEDURAL GUARANTEES
Beyond the conceptual understanding and relation of justice and fairness,
the question is whether universal jurisdiction is in fact as unjust or unfair as
Fletcher suggests.
A general concern silently running through Fletcher's entire comment is his
assumption that basic guarantees of a fair trial could not be complied with if the
prosecution and trial took place in a jurisdiction which has no connection
whatsoever with the case, either by way of the territory where the crime is
committed or of the nationality of the offender or victim.3" Fletcher obviously-
though not explicitly-judges the Rome Statute against the background of the
American Constitution and tradition, and finds the Rome Statute to fall short
because neither its preamble "even mentions the duty to ensure a fair trial of the
accused 3 2 nor does the Statute itself contain a "catalogue of procedural
guarantees. 3 3 Even worse, in universal jurisdiction Fletcher sees the rights of the
accused being put behind those of the victims 34 who, as already mentioned, he
considers as "clamour[ing] not for fair trials for the accused.,
35
We cannot ignore the fact that the standards of a fair trial differ among the
numerous and varied jurisdictions of the world, some of which even lack any kind
of procedural guarantees whatsoever. Again, however, the question is whether
and to what degree such deficiencies may fairly be attributed to universal
jurisdiction. Without wanting to take Fletcher's concerns too lightly, some
objections may be raised:
Should Fletcher's concerns mandate distrust of all justice systems that do not
live up to the fair trial standards of the United States (or comparable countries
cherishing the rule of law), then all countries that do not meet these standards
would have to be excluded from concurrent extraterritorial jurisdiction, regardless
of whether it is founded on the principle of universality or on any other
connection with the case (be it defensive territoriality or the nationality of the
perpetrator or victim). This, however, would necessarily lead to discrimination
between reliable and unreliable jurisdictions. If this were not restricted to
individual abuse cases such as "sham trials, 36 but performed by excluding certain
countries from extraterritorial jurisdiction in general, that would be hardly be
reconcilable with the principal equality of sovereign states, as long as they are
members of the United Nations.
31. Fletcher, supra n. 1, at 582-83.
32. Id. at 582.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 583.
35. Id. at 581; supra text accompanying n. 25.
36. Infra pts. V.B. & V.C.
20041
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Even if this radical step could be avoided and the risk of presumably unfair
trials could be minimized by restricting extraterritorial jurisdiction to the
"classical" connections of territoriality and nationality of the offender or victim, it
may be questioned whether this really hits the decisive point. For why should a
court that bases its jurisdiction on one of these "classical" connections be more
likely to abide by the rules of fair trial than a court that acts according to the
principle of universality? Should the only explanation be that "'disconnected'
jurisdiction[s]," as Fletcher likes to describe (or rather, to devaluate?) jurisdictions
basing their judicial power on the universality principle,37 could, in absence of any
local or national interest in the case, be motivated only by political bias or wild-
running victims? Although admittedly, such abuse can never completely be
excluded, prosecutions based on the principles of territoriality or nationality are
no less safe from political bias. This is even more true in jurisdictions that-
instead of being governed by the principle of mandatory prosecution-even in
cases with sufficient evidence leave the prosecution under the discretion of the
state attorney who is under supervision all the way up to the attorney general who,
in turn, is a member of the government and, thus, a political figure. If we further
keep in mind that international crimes-the main instances of universal
jurisdiction-are classic examples of so-called "state supported crimes," isn't then
the chance of political bias in refraining from prosecution particularly great with
regard to jurisdiction based on territoriality and/or nationality?
Could not therefore the potential lack of prosecutorial interest of countries
connected to the case be exactly the reason why we need impartial and neutral
jurisdiction by countries that are not directly involved, namely those that step in
for no other reason than to protect universal values? And if a jurisdiction is
taking this burden, why should it not be prepared to perform a fair trial? If one
wants examples of non-partisan universal jurisdiction and fair treatment of the
accused, Germany could provide them: one in the Tadic case, where the
prosecution was guided by no other motive than the prosecution of an
38international crime, and another in the Mounir El Motassadeq and Abdelghani
Mzoudi cases, in which the German courts, by discharging the defendants when
U.S. authorities withheld evidence for reasons of "national security," adhered
even more closely to the requirements of fair trial than was desired by the United
States. 39 Is there any reason to believe that in such cases the treatment of the
accused would have been different if instead of the territoriality principle the
prosecution had proceeded via universal jurisdiction?
Last but not least, as to the due process concerns voiced by Fletcher with
regard to the Rome Statute, 40 he may be right in missing a "catalogued" list of
37. Fletcher, supra n. 1, at 582-83.
38. Supra n. 20 and accompanying text.
39. BGH decision of 4 March 2004, Case No. 3 StR 218/2003, reprinted in: Neue Juristische
Wochenschrift (NJW) 2004, 1259; Roger Boyes, US Clash Looms as Germany Quashes 9/11
Conviction, Times (London) 22 (Mar. 5, 2004).
40. Fletcher, supra n. 1, at 582-83; supra text accompanying note 31.
[Vol. 39:955
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procedural guarantees (although I am not sure whether the guarantees in
American law may indeed be called a "catalogue"). But be it as it is, the absence
of a catalogue does not mean the absence of procedural guarantees, including
fairness of the trial. For what else than "procedural guarantees" could one call the
various rights of persons during an investigation and the duties of the prosecutor
and the court, which are found in Articles 53 to 76 of the Rome Statute? Taken
together, these provisions amount to a list many national criminal procedure codes
could be proud of. Even compared to American procedural guarantees, contrary
to widespread criticism, the Rome Statute does not fall substantially short,41 a fact
demonstrated by a representative of the American Bar Association's statement to
Congress that "the Treaty of Rome contains the most comprehensive list of due
process protections which has so far been promulgated. 4 2
V. "DOUBLE JEOPARDY"-"NE BIS IN IDEM"
Particularly harsh are Fletcher's repetitive attacks toward "double
jeopardy." He sees this constitutional prohibition ignored to such a degree that
"[t]his issue in itself demonstrates the fundamental injustice of universal
jurisdiction. 43  Guided by the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution,
implying that "a verdict of not guilty is final,"44 Fletcher seems concerned in
particular by three transnational scenarios. In the first one the victims again play
the "bad guys": in the exercise of universal jurisdiction he sees "no guarantee
whatsoever against hounding an accused in one court after another until the
victims are satisfied that justice has been done., 4' A second source of multiple
trials may be that countries eager to wield "primary responsibility" (because of the
territory concerned or the nationality of the defendant) will-in his eyes-not be
prepared to accept a prior judgment by a "disconnected" country claiming
universal jurisdiction.46 He sees a third gate to repetitive prosecution in the Rome
Statute's allowing the ICC to reopen a case if the trial by a national jurisdiction
"was inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice., 47
A
By referring to "double jeopardy," from which the defendant shall be
protected by the principle of ne bis in idem,48 Fletcher certainly hits a crucial point,
41. For a comparative analysis, see Diane Marie Amann & M.N.S. Sellers, The United States of
America and the International Criminal Court, 50 Am. J. Comp. L. 381 (Supp. 2002).
42. H.R. Comm. Intl. Rel., H.R. 4654, American Servicemembers' Protection Act, 106th Cong. (July
25, 2000) (testimony of Monroe Leigh). This source is cited by Amann & Sellers, supra n. 41, at 390.
43. Fletcher, supra n. 1, at 582.
44. Id. at 580.
45. Id. at 582.
46. Id. at 582-83.
47. Rome Statute art. 20; see Fletcher, supra n. 1, at 582 (deviating somewhat from the wording of
the Statute).
48. Although "double jeopardy" and ne bis in idem are closely connected with each other, it
remains questionable whether the concepts are completely identical, as Fletcher seems to suggest by
20041
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for there can be no doubt that so far the protection of a defendant against a
second or third prosecution beyond national borders is far from satisfactory. Even
where international instruments take notice of the principle of ne bis in idem ,4
they are primarily, if not exclusively, directed at obliging the treaty member states
to guarantee ne bis in idem within their own national jurisdiction, rather than
barring concurrent or consecutive prosecutions transnationally between member
states. To mention only two prominent examples, Article 14(7) of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as well as Article 4 of
Protocol No. 7 to the European Convention of Human Rights oblige the member
states to do nothing more than protect a person who has already been finally
acquitted or convicted against being tried or punished again in criminal
proceedings under the jurisdiction of the same state.5 °  Although certain
international instruments go further and bar multiple prosecutions beyond
national borders as well, such hopeful exceptions from a general lack of
transnational ne bis in idem can so far only be found among certain regions, in
particular the so-called Schengen-States in Europe,5 or as drafted in the Charter
of Basic Rights of the European Union (Article 50).52 Therefore, as long as we do
not have an internationally binding prohibition against consecutive prosecutions
of a person who has already been tried finally (and convicted or acquitted) in
another foreign jurisdiction, it remains up to the national sovereign how to react
to a final judgment by another jurisdiction. This has been done up to now in three
main ways. First, very few countries, such as the Netherlands, recognize foreign
judgments and thus refrain from their own prosecution. The second approach is
the most common, and the one adopted by the U.S. jurisdiction: 3 to simply ignore
foreign proceedings and allow for a new prosecution. Third is the middle course,
adopted by countries like Germany that do not bar a new prosecution, but do at
least take a foreign conviction into account when deciding on a new sentence,
according to the so-called "deduction principle. 54
speaking of "the prohibition of double jeopardy (ne bis in idem)." Fletcher, supra n. 1, at 580; see also
infra n. 68 and accompanying text.
49. See generally Gerard Conway, Ne Bis in Idem in International Law, 3 Intl. Crim. L. Rev. 217
(2003).
50. This restriction of international instruments on the enforcement of ne bis in idem within a state's
own jurisdiction is unfortunately not always made clear, even in general surveys such as Immi Tallgren,
Article 20: Ne Bis in Idem, in Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court:
Observers' Notes, Article by Article 419 (Otto Triffterer ed., Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft 1999);
Christine Van den Wyngaert & Tom Ongena, Ne Bis in Idem Principle, Including the Issue of Amnesty,
in The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary vol. 1, 705, 706 (Antonio
Cassese, Paola Gaeta & John R.W.D. Jones eds., Oxford U. Press 2002).
51. M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Extradition: United States Law and Practice 693-94 (4th ed.,
Oceana Publications 2002); Tallgren, supra n. 50, at 423.
52. For details concerning these international instruments, see Albin Eser, Justizielle Rechte, in
Kommentar zur Charta der Grundrechte der Europaischen Union 548-55 (JOrgen Meyer ed., Nomos
Verlagsgesellschaft 2003).
53. See infra nn. 78-83.
54. For a detailed comparative survey, also with regard to different ways of taking a former
judgment into account, see Herbert Thomas, Das Recht auf Einmaligkeit der Strafverfolgung: Vom
Nationalen zum Internationalen Ne Bis in Idem 40 (Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft 2000); see also Van den
[Vol. 39:955
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Yet again, even though the protection against transnational multiple
prosecutions is admittedly unsatisfactory, it is not universal jurisdiction that is
uniquely to be blamed. On the contrary, these deficiencies are rather
characteristic of concurrent national jurisdictions in general and thus no less true
with regard to jurisdiction based on the "classical" connections of territoriality and
nationality of the offender or victim. Perhaps one could dare to guess that the
competition between different national jurisdictions to try a case may be even
more uncompromising if "classical" connections are in concurrence with each
other. If, for example, a German terrorist bombed an American tour bus in
Madrid and fled to Paris, why should not each of the countries concerned attempt
to get the perpetrator extradited: to Spain based on the territory of commission, to
Germany based on the nationality of the defendant, or to the United States based
on the nationality of the victims? Further, under current paradigms, why should
these states not reopen the case if they were not satisfied with the judgment of a
concurrent jurisdiction? As these "connected" jurisdictions can very well be
biased for a multitude of reasons, particularly their own national interest, would it
not then be wiser to conduct the trial in France, a "disconnected" and thus less
directly concerned jurisdiction, according to the principle of universality (for
fighting international terrorism)?55 And would it be really out of line to deem
"disinterested impartiality" also wise in the reverse case in that "connected"
jurisdictions-for whatever reason-do not want or dare to take the responsibility
and would rather leave the prosecution to a "disconnected" neutral country
according to the principle of universality?
B
As Fletcher was focused on universal jurisdiction instead of realizing the
risks of double jeopardy as a problem common to all types of concurrent national
jurisdictions (including those based on "classical" connections of territoriality and
nationality of the defendant or victim), he also missed the Rome Statute's
noteworthy focus on ne bis in idem. Without first paying due attention to the
rule-that is, the principal recognition of ne bis in idem6-he directly criticizes the
exception-the "sham clause"-for allowing a new prosecution if the first
proceeding was a "fake trial."57 Even if such exceptional provisos bear the risk of
undermining the principle of ne bis in idem (although it may be noted that similar
"sham clauses" are not foreign to the American understanding of "double
jeopardy" either'), Fletcher either does not witness or at least does not sincerely
appreciate the fundamental message resonating in the principal reaffirmation of
the transnational ne bis in idem in the Rome Statute's Article 20--this being a
Wyngaert & Ongena, supra n. 50, at 710-13; Tallgren, supra n. 50, at 424-33 (particularly with regard to
the genesis of the ne bis in idem regulation in the Rome Statute).
55. Concerning this "distancing" from local concern, see infra pt. VII & n. 91.
56. Rome Statute art. 20(1), 20(2).
57. Rome Statute art. 20(3).
58. See infra n. 75 and accompanying text.
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concept that has already been recognized in the Statutes of the International
Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia (Article 10) and Rwanda (Article
9).59 Even if its bar against a renewed prosecution is not absolute, the Rome
Statute proclaims that as a matter of principle final judgments (convictions as well
as acquittals) of national and international courts should indeed be final; and even
if justice, because of having been gravely abused, calls for a new proceeding, this is
not a matter of the ICC's sovereign arbitrary discretion, but can be done under
certain conditions only.60 This relationship of rule and exception is hardly
described correctly, if not even reversed, when Fletcher writes "the ICC will
decide on a case-by-case basis whether the judgments of other courts are worthy
of its respect., 61 If this meant that the ICC would have to respect prior national
judgments only if it found that the national court "had an intent to bring the
person concerned to justice," as Fletcher suggests by questionably transforming
62the negative phrasing of the Rome Statute into a positive intent-requirement, the
ICC would be upgraded to a sort of supranational appeal court by which a
proceeding would not be final until the ICC had spoken. Even if envisioning
"global justice, 63 this is certainly not the picture the parents of the ICC had in
mind.
So, contrary to Fletcher's impression that the Rome Statute's protection
against double jeopardy lags behind "the kind of guarantee against repetitive
prosecution that is anchored in all the civilized constitutions of the world" and that
this endangerment of the dignity of the accused is getting even worse by the
exercise of universal jurisdiction by national courts,64 I find that, thanks to the
proclamations of the ne bis in idem principle in the Statutes of the International
Criminal Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda and in the Rome Statute, the
transnational protection against repetitive prosecutions has improved rather than
worsened. What is more, one might expect that the growing consciousness toward
"double jeopardy" will also influence national courts to handle universal
jurisdiction in a cautious way, particularly in refraining from repetitive
prosecutions. At any rate, even on the level of horizontal concurrence between
national jurisdictions on extraterritorial crimes it does not matter very much
59. As to certain differences with regard to the "upward" and "downward" effects of the ne bis in
idem provisions in the Rome Statute and the Ad Hoc-Tribunals, which are partly due to the (mere)
complementarity jurisdiction of the ICC and not of essential relevance here, see Van den Wyngaert &
Ongena, supra n. 50, at 723-26; Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia, UN Doc. S/Res/827 (May 25, 1993); Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda, UN Doc. S/Res/955 (Nov. 8, 1994).
60. Although Rome Statute Article 20(3) does not explicitly state which jurisdiction has the burden
of proof, that the first proceeding was (a) "for the purpose of shielding the person" or (b) "not
conducted independently or impartially," in view of the principal priority of the national courts and the
mere complementarity of the ICC the burden of proof must evidently be with the latter one. This
would also be in accordance with "[t]he emphasis of the paragraph ... to underline the generality of
the ne bis in idem principle and the marginality of the exceptions." Tallgren, supra n. 50, at 430.
61. Fletcher, supra n. 1, at 582.
62. Id. As to Fletcher's own wording of the Rome Statute, see Fletcher, supra n. 1, 582-583; text
accompanying supra n. 46.
63. Infra pt. VII.
64. Fletcher, supra n. 1, at 582.
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whether a proceeding is based on universal jurisdiction or on a "classical"
connection. This does not mean that the situation is already completely
satisfactory and does not need improvements, as will be discussed later,65 but still
the picture is not as dark as that drawn by Fletcher.
C
However, could he not argue that the picture on the universal scene is still
darker than the national protection against double jeopardy in the United States,
thus explaining why this government refrained from joining the Rome Statute? I
must confess that I was very impressed when-many years ago-I learned of the
U.S. Constitution's protection against double jeopardy, which appeared far more
solid and comprehensive than the guarantees to be found in European
constitutions or criminal procedure codes. Therefore, at first sight, Fletcher
appeared to be convincing when he compared shortcomings in foreign and
international guarantees of ne bis in idem with the seemingly more fortified
protection against double jeopardy under American law. At a closer comparison,
however, I am not so sure any more that the American guarantees against double
jeopardy are as good as represented or even superior to others. Without
pretending to give a full picture, some doubts may be raised.
To begin with a purported shortcoming of European codes Fletcher found
worthwhile to mention, he contrasted the American rule that "a verdict of not
guilty is final" with the right of a European prosecutor to appeal a non-guilty
verdict or to reopen the case, though mostly on certain restrictive conditions, as,
for instance, on the basis of new evidence of guilt.6 6 On the one hand, perhaps
American observers may not be satisfied with the explanation that a proceeding is
not "final" as long as ordinary remedies are possible and therefore the appeal by
the prosecutor is still the same and not a second prosecution. On the other hand,
however, European observers may wonder about the American phenomenon of a
"mistrial,, 67 as in cases of a "hung," biased, or unduly influenced jury: if in such
cases the defendant has to undergo a second proceeding, is this less a further
jeopardy than being exposed to the ordinary appeal of a European prosecutor?
At any rate, the commonly accepted rationale for not attaching double jeopardy in
the United States if the first trial ended in a mistrial, that the defendant has no
65. Infra pt. VII.
66. Fletcher, supra n. 1, at 580. Fletcher's description is difficult to address in such a general way, as
he does not differentiate between "ordinary" appeals (by the prosecutor) and the "extraordinary"
reopening of a case; the preconditions for these two types of remedies are substantially different and
may vary from country to country. For a comprehensive comparison (including U.S. law), though not
completely up to date anymore, see Die Wiederaufnahme des Strafrerfahrens im deutschen und
auslandischen Recht (Hans-Heinrich Jescheck & Jurgen Meyer eds., Ludwig Rohrscheid Verlag 1974);
more recently (again, including U.S. law) see Rechtsmittel im Strafrecht: eine international vergleichende
Untersuchung zur Rechtswirklichkeit und Effizienz von Rechtsmitteln (Monika Becker & J6rg Kinzig
eds., edition iuscrim 2000).
67. For a comprehensive survey, including impressive references to case law, see David N. Cinotti,
Gregory R. Jones & Scott C. Weidenfeller, Double Jeopardy, in Thirty-First Annual Review of
Criminal Procedure, 90 Geo. L.J. 1528, 1533-39 (2002).
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interest in preserving the finality of the judgment and must bow to the
government's interest in case of a "manifest necessity" to declare a mistrial,68 is
strikingly similar to the rationale for the European notion of granting the
prosecutor the right to appeal.
Still leaving the international dimension of consecutive proceedings aside, a
more serious weak point within the American system is the notion of the "same
offense" for which nobody shall be put twice in jeopardy. Whereas the European
principle of ne bis in idem is open for interpreting "idem" (the same) as "idem
crimen" (in normative terms of the "offense") or as "idem factum" (in terms of the
"act" as the historical event the indictment is based on),69 the wording of the
double jeopardy clause in the Fifth Amendment is attached to the "offense."
Although this difference between the American "double jeopardy" clause and the
European ne bis in idem principle is also recognized by Fletcher, 0 he does not
seem fully aware of the much broader protection available if the "same" is
understood as the historical-factual "act" (with all its circumstances and
consequences) than if it is restricted to the indicted "offense." This is particularly
true if the same "offense" is construed in such a narrow way that basically any
change of the indictment with regard to the crime provision allows a further
prosecution. Even if it was not reconcilable with the plain wording of the U.S.
Constitution simply to exchange "offense" (in its normative sense) for "act" (in its
factual dimension), it remains difficult to understand why the "offense" is
interpreted in such a narrow manner that-according to the so-called
Blockburger7 test-any element not contained in the previously charged offense
is able to constitute a new offense which, since not being the same as the previous
one, may additionally be prosecuted.72
As if the highly praised barrier to double jeopardy was not diminished
enough, the so-called "dual sovereignty doctrine" provides further doorways for
double prosecutions: because the violation of criminal provisions of two
different-federal and state-sovereigns by the same act are considered to be
different offenses, "a prior state prosecution is no bar to a federal prosecution, and
vice-versa. 7 3 An instance of this rule, which was observed worldwide and which
could hardly hide that a second prosecution for the same action in fact means a
double jeopardy to the defendant, was the Rodney King case, in which police
68. David S. Rudstein, Double Jeopardy and the Fraudulently-Obtained Acquittal, 60 Mo. L. Rev.
607, 632-33 (1995). For a further explanation of the different common and civil law conceptions of the
appeal of an acquittal or lenient sentence by the prosecution, see Conway, supra n. 49, at 228-29.
69. Bassiouni, supra n. 51, at 695; Van den Wyngaert & Ongena, supra n. 50, at 713-15; Thomas,
supra n. 54, at 188.
70. Fletcher, supra n. 1, at 581.
71. See Blockburger v. U.S., 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932).
72. Although for three years (1990-1993) the Blockburger test was replaced by Grady v. Corbin, 495
U.S. 508, 521-22 (1990), which attached double jeopardy if an essential element of the offense charged
constituted conduct for which the defendant had been previously charged, Grady was overturned and
Blockburger reinstated by U.S. v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 703-12 (1993).
73. Wayne R. LaFave, Criminal Law 145 n. 82 (3d ed., West 2000); see Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S.
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officers, after having been acquitted by a California jury of beating King nearly to
death, were retried and convicted by a federal court.74
A further way to circumvent the double jeopardy bar is the nullification of
an acquittal if it was procured by fraud and collusion.7' Although it appears
understandable that an accused should not profit from having reached an acquittal
by illegal means, the fact is that by considering "sham" trials and acquittals as null
and void, the way is opened for a second trial with regard to the same offense.
And even if the prior trial, as a fake, has not been a real "jeopardy" to the
defendant, Fletcher's statement that "a verdict of not guilty is final ' 76 is not true
even within the American justice system.
D
And this is even less true when we move to the transnational scene.77 With
regard to the American approach to double jeopardy in relation to foreign
jurisdictions, two scenarios are to be distinguished. One in which an accused
already tried by a foreign sovereign enters the defense of double jeopardy against
a new trial by a U.S. court, which will commonly not accept the prior foreign
conviction 78 as a bar to a new proceeding in the United States. In applying the
"dual sovereignty doctrine" (or, because of the additional international dimension,
the "multiple sovereignty doctrine") in the Rashed79 case, the court found that the
protection against double jeopardy "does not extend to sequential prosecutions by
separate sovereigns for the same offense."80
With regard to the other scenario, where an accused who has been
previously tried by a U.S. court invokes "double jeopardy" against his extradition
to a foreign sovereign, this defense is normally not successful either: first, because
74. Susan Herman, Double Jeopardy All Over Again: Dual Sovereignty, Rodney King, and the
ACLU, 41 UCLA L. Rev. 609, 625 (1994). For further critical appraisals of the dual sovereignty rule,
see Dax Eric Lopez, Not Twice for the Same: How the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine Is Used to Circumvent
Non Bis in Idem, 33 Vand. J. Transnatl. L. 1263, 1293 n. 229 (2000); David Bryan Owsley, Accepting
the Dual Sovereignty Exception to Double Jeopardy: A Hard Case Study, 81 Wash. U. L.Q. 765, 781-82
(2003).
75. See e.g. State v. Howell, 66 S.E.2d 701, 706 (S.C. 1951). For criticism, see Rudstein, supra n. 68,
at 634.
76. Fletcher, supra n. 1, at 580.
77. Thomas Franck, An International Lawyer Looks at the Bartkus Rule, 34 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1096,
1103 (1959).
78. Similarly, US courts hesitate to recognize foreign pardons, for instance, where the defendant is
to be deported for a crime of moral turpitude for which a foreign pardon has been granted. Ronald C.
Slye, The Legitimacy of Amnesties under International Law and General Principles of Anglo-American
Law: Is a Legitimate Amnesty Possible?, 43 Va. J. Intl. L. 173, 219 (2002).
79. U.S. v. Rashed, 83 F. Supp. 2d 96, 100 (1999).
80. Id. On the same line, the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
maintains in Section 483 note 3 that the United States does not generally enforce or recognize foreign
penal judgments. Exceptions from this general disregard of foreign proceedings seem only be made
where an interstate treaty obligates the United States to heed foreign proceedings, see e.g. U.S. v.
Jurado-Rodriguez, 907 F. Supp. 568 (E.D.N.Y. 1995), or where a foreign proceeding is virtually
controlled by the United States, that is, where-under the so-called sham exception to the dual
sovereign rule-foreign officials have "little or no independent volition" in their states' trial. Rashed,
83 F. Supp. 2d at 102 (quoting U.S. v. Liddy, 542 F.2d 76, 79 (D.C. Cir. 1979)).
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in cases in which the extradition request is governed by an interstate treaty, a
double jeopardy clause therein is regularly interpreted so narrowly as to permit
extradition;" and second, because according to U.S. case law, barring multiple
prosecutions by different sovereigns is not accepted as a stand-alone principle of
international law, and the double jeopardy rule is therefore only binding on the
United States as a treaty obligation. As stated in the Martin case: "The
Constitution of the United States has not adopted the doctrine of international
double jeopardy., 83
E
In summing up what remains of Fletcher's criticism that by the exercise of
universal jurisdiction the defendant would lack the protection against double
jeopardy as guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution and tradition, the following
findings of our analysis and comparison may be remembered:
First, if a country assumes jurisdiction over an extraterritorial crime, the
protection within its own national justice system against double jeopardy is in no
way stronger or weaker if the prosecution or trial is based upon the universality
principle than it would be if performed under one of the "classical" connections
(such as territoriality by "ubiquity," "constructive presence," or "defensive
territoriality," or by nationality of the defendant or victim). There are neither
reasons nor indications that a national court would take the principle of ne bis in
idem less seriously if it proceeds according to the principle of universality.
Second, even if it must be taken into account that the national guarantees
against double jeopardy may differ from one country to another, that does not
mean that the U.S. standard is the best possible, leaving all other jurisdictions
behind, and that consequently, an American defendant could only lose if he or she
is not tried in a U.S. court. With all respect, when Fletcher sees European codes
falling slightly short of the American double jeopardy standard, I humbly dare to
say that the opposite may be true if we remember various ways in which the bar
against a second proceeding can be circumvented under American law.
Third, when it comes to the transnational recognition of foreign judgments,
the U.S. position remains highly conservative in its not accepting any international
ne bis in idem and its not following any modern movement to protect a defendant
against multiple prosecutions by different sovereigns. By not recognizing the
doctrine of international double jeopardy, the United States does not deem its
power to initiate a new proceeding to be barred by a foreign judgment, nor does it
feel obliged to take a foreign punishment into account in its own sentencing.
81. See e.g. Sindona v. Grant, 619 F.2d 167, 179 (2d Cir. 1980) (determining whether double
jeopardy attaches, and taking into account whether the requesting state had a compelling interest to
prosecute the accused); Elcock v. U.S., 80 F. Supp. 2d 70, 83 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (eventually applying the
Blockburger test to elucidate whether the extradition request violated the Fifth Amendment).
82. Lopez, supra n. 74, at 1281.
83. U.S. v. Martin, 574 F.2d 1359, 1360 (5th Cir. 1978).
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Fourth, when Fletcher criticizes the ne bis in idem regulation of the Rome
Statute, he fails to recognize two important developments. First is the explicit
acknowledgement of a transnational ne bis in idem that, although still not
complete, is going further than most international instruments and national laws
(including the American). Second is the inclusion of a "sham clause," which must
be understood less as an impairment of (hardly) legitimate rights of the defendant
than as a remedy for the abuse of justice-a remedy, by the way, which is, as
Fletcher is certainly aware, not foreign to American case law either.
To be sure, the rejection of Fletcher's concerns with regard to the protection
against double jeopardy in international jurisdiction is not to say that everything is
fine; for even if the state of protection against double jeopardy is not as one-
sidedly bad as he makes us believe, there is still no reason for satisfaction.
Therefore, any improvements in the international recognition of ne bis in idem
would be welcome. In this respect, two recent efforts may be mentioned: the
Freiburg Proposal on Concurrent Jurisdictions and the Prohibition of Multiple
Prosecutions in the European Union,84 and-on a global scale-the Seventeenth
International Conference on Criminal Law of the Association Internationale de
Droit P6nal with its section on "Concurrent National and International Criminal
Jurisdiction and the Principle ne bis in idem," to be held in Beijing in September
2004.85
VI. DEFENDANT-VICTIM-STATE-COMMUNITY: DIVERGENT INTERESTS
If we looked for a clue to grasp Fletcher's reserved, if not hostile, attitude
toward universal jurisdiction, it could be found in his view of the various parties to
a criminal proceeding and his presumptive order of priorities.
I guess everybody can go along with him when he lists the defendant, the
victim, the state, and the community as parties with possibly divergent interests.
Beyond these interests, in universal settings, which are characteristic of
transnational prosecutions, the sovereignty interests of concurring jurisdictions,
especially member states of international treaties such as the Rome Statute, have
to be taken into account.86
Less easy, however, is it to follow his order of priorities in which the
defendant is put first and the victim second. And when the victim is additionally
described as screaming for justice even at the cost of an unfair trial to the
81defendant, one gets the impression of two victims: the real victim of the crime
and the offender as "victim" of the proceeding, and the latter seems to be even
84. Freiburg Proposal on Concurrent Jurisdictions and the Prohibition of Multiple Prosecutions in
the European Union (Anke Biehler, Roland Kniebuihler, Juliette Lelieur-Fischer & Sybil Stein eds.,
Max Planck Inst. for For. and Intl. Crim. L. 2003) (available at <http://www.iuscrim.mpg.de/forsch/
straf/docs/FreiburgProposal nbii.pdf>) [hereinafter Freiburg Proposal].
85. Id. at preface. The national reports of a pre-colloquium to the subject held in Berlin in June
2003 will be published in Revue Internationale de Droit Pgnal (2004). Id.
86. Fletcher, supra n. 1, at 580 (with regard to the defendant), 581 (the victim and the state), 582
(the member states of the Rome Treaty), 583 (the community).
87. Id. at 581.
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more pitiable and in need of protection than the first one. In such a scenario,
universal jurisdiction must indeed appear to be particularly detrimental if it truly
"favours the rights of the victim over the rights of the accused." 88 Yet, is this really
the case? And is the order of priorities truly to be seen as Fletcher describes it? I
have various doubts.
To start with the most basic one, I would like to question whether the first
priority must be with the accused. Although I am aware that in the American
tradition the protection of the defendant from an "almighty" state plays an
eminent role, I wonder why and how this should legitimize putting defendants'
interests over those of the victims. When Fletcher is saying so, he seems to
confuse means and ends of a criminal proceeding and to attend to the second step
before having paid due attention to the first one. Of course, when a criminal
proceeding has been started, the defendant must be guaranteed a fair trial. But
prior to the proceeding is the commission of a crime leaving a victim who has an
individual right to compensation and possibly also an interest in punishment, be it
in terms of a personal right or by representation of the state and community
whose laws are violated. Hence, when a criminal proceeding is performed, this is
not done for the sake of demonstrating fairness to the accused, but for the
sanctioning of a crime, whatever the different ends of punishment, deterrence,
rehabilitation, etc., may be. Therefore, instead of one having priority over the
other, we should think in terms of equality. Thus, just as the accused is entitled to
be treated by fair means, the proceeding must also not lose sight of its ends with
regard to the victim's interests.
Against this structural conception of integral fairness on equal terms it is
difficult for me to follow Fletcher when he sees "the presumptive order [of the
accused as first priority, the victim coming second] reversed," 89 as seemingly
evidenced by the Rome Statute. If he considers the Preamble to the Rome
Statute, because of affirming that unimaginable atrocities to humanity must not go
unpunished, as "enthron[ing] the victims as the primary interest in the trial,"9
then this Statute is, in fact, doing nothing more than stressing the obvious aim of
any criminal proceeding, without indicating anywhere that this aim should be
pursued by unfair means.9' By the same token, I cannot see any evidence or
reason why national courts should proceed less fairly with defendants when
exercising universal jurisdiction.92
Incidentally, it might be interesting to note that although Fletcher considers
the accused in the Rome Statute to be disadvantaged in comparison to the victim,
others-and not only promoters of victims' rights in international criminal law-
88. Id. at 583.
89. Id. at 581; see text accompanying supra n. 88.
90. Fletcher, supra n. 1, at 581-82.
91. As to Fletcher's further-unfounded-suggestion that the Rome Statute would not contain
adequate procedural guarantees to the accused, see supra Part IV and notes 40-42.
92. See supra pt. IV & n. 39.
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see the victims' role, though certainly better than in most national procedures or
in the Statutes of the Ad-Hoc-Tribunals, still in need of further improvement.
93
Although more of factual nature, I wonder why Fletcher draws such a bad
picture of victims: "clamour[ing] not for fair trials for the accused but primarily for
justice," "hounding" the accused in one court after another until justice has been
done9 4-even if this may happen, particularly if victims are inflamed by public
campaigns or professional promoters, can that be universalized as normal reality?
VII. FROM "LOCAL CONCERN" TO "GLOBAL JUSTICE"
Contrary to the detrimental role Fletcher ascribes to victims as "hounds" for
universal jurisdiction, a more favorable consideration is granted to the state as
third in line of his order of priorities to be taken into account in every case and,
even more, to the local community within which the crime occurs.95
This position is comprehensible insofar as, first, the state prosecuting the
crime is seen as both representing-and, at the same time neutralizing-the
individual victim and as defending the public interest inherently also violated by
the offense, and, second, the local community is confronted with the crime and the
conflict it reflects. This "principle of local concern," 96 that Fletcher finds
expressed in the accused's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial in the "state and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed," 97 is only convincing,
however, as long as a crime is indeed not more than a "local affair" in that no
other people or interests than those of the state of the commission of the crime are
affected. Yet, this is not the kind of crime we are dealing with in the realm of
universal jurisdiction: however horrible the sexual abuse of a local prisoner by a
local police officer or the killing of numerous schoolchildren by a classmate may
be, to put the torture of foreign captives by soldiers or the genocide of ethnically
different villagers on the same level would be like comparing apples with oranges,
though both of terrible magnitude.
It is this qualitative difference between "normal" crimes of merely local
scope and crimes against universally recognized values that I think Fletcher is not
taking seriously enough. Doubtless, no crime is without some local concern, for
even in the case in which foreign gangs, which one wants out of town anyway, are
killing each other, the community is affected by the mere occurrence of the crime
on its territory. But what makes "universal crimes" different is that these are not
93. Theo van Boven, The Position of the Victim in the Statute of the International Criminal Court, in
Reflections on the International Criminal Court: Essays in Honour of Adriaan Bos 77, 88 (Herman
A.M. von Hebel, Johan G. Lammers & Jolien Schukking eds., T.M.C. Asser Press 1999); David Donat-
Catin, The Role of Victims in ICC Proceedings, in Essays on the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court vol. 1, 251 (Flavia Lattanzi & Willam A. Schabas eds., Il Sirente 1999); Claude Jorda &
J6r6me de Hemptinne, The Status and Role of the Victim, in The Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court: A Commentary vol. 2, 1387, 1408 (Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta & John R.W.D.
Jones eds., Oxford U. Press 2002).
94. Fletcher, supra n. 1, at 581.
95. Id. at 581, 583.
96. Id. at 583.
97. Id. at 583 (emphasis omitted).
2004]
19
Eser: For Universal Jurisdiction: Against Fletcher's Antagonism
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2003
TULSA LAW REVIEW
only of local or national interest but of transnational concern as well, such as the
particularly abhorrent terrorist attacks of September 11 or crimes against
humanity in Iraq. Thus, although the territorial jurisdiction, as the national
jurisdiction of the defendant or victim, is certainly more closely "connected" with
the crime, when we consider the interests worthy of protection, it may be
questioned whether it is accurate for Fletcher to speak of the universal as
"disconnected" jurisdiction. 98 It may be "disconnected" in physical terms, but not
with regard to the legal interest to be protected.
Yet even more deplorable is Fletcher's obvious unwillingness to turn his
view from "local concerns" to what may be envisioned as "global justice." As a
consequence, he misses the chance to bring the exercise of universal jurisdiction
by national courts and of supranational jurisdiction by the ICC into a
comprehensive concept. This perspective seems blocked by the different role
conceded to the "local concern" on these two levels of jurisdiction: whereas he
finds "[t]he primacy of local concern.., recognized under the ICC's principle of
complementarity," 99 he sees it "ignored under the doctrine of universal
jurisdiction. '"'0° This observation is to some degree correct if limited to the status
quo, but hardly suitable for truly comprehending the full potential of the Rome
Statute.
First, when the exercise of universal jurisdiction by national courts is said to
ignore local concern, then this may indeed be the case, yet not necessarily so. For
even if the principle of universality stretches national criminal law onto certain
extraterritorial crimes, the exercise of jurisdiction can still be made contingent on
further requisites, such as the apprehension of the accused within this territory.
And even if a case of this so-called "conditional universal jurisdiction"10 1 was
given, the jurisdiction of the place of apprehension might still yield priority to the
jurisdiction wherein the crime was committed, provided that the territorial
jurisdiction takes serious steps to prosecute the accused. If the territorial
jurisdiction does not do so (for instance, where the territorial jurisdiction does not
even request extradition), one could hardly recognize a real local concern. If in
such a situation a jurisdiction applies its power to prosecute an international crime
according to the principle of universality, it would be difficult to understand why
this jurisdiction should be barred by "lack of local concern."
Second, if one objected that instead of the territorial jurisdiction perhaps the
national jurisdiction of the defendant or victim would like to step in, then this
again may be a reason for jurisdictions with no direct connections with the case to
refrain from initiating their own actions as long as the other jurisdiction proceeds
with the prosecution. To be sure, however, if in this case the prior proceeding is
98. Therefore, when in connection with "double jeopardy" I find myself using Fletcher's language
of universal as "disconnected" jurisdiction (as in Part V, in the text accompanying note 50), this should
not be considered as agreement in substance.
99. Fletcher, supra n. 1, at 583.
100. Id.
101. Cassese, supra n. 17, at 285.
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not based on territoriality of the crime but on the nationality of the offender and
victim, one cannot speak of local concern anymore-unless "local" is not meant in
a territorial manner but rather in terms of any connection with the case. Then,
however, the question arises why the prosecution of crimes against universal
values should not constitute an equal "concern."
Third, what has been said before with regard to national proceedings is
similarly applicable to supranational jurisdiction, as in the Rome Statute's
principle of complementarity, under which the ICC has no jurisdiction as long as
the state which has jurisdiction by territoriality or by the nationality of the
defendant is able and willing genuinely to prosecute'02 That means that on this
supranational level, "local concern" in terms of territoriality is not the only
primacy, but instead, the nationality of the defendant-perhaps far away from the
place of commission-can be of relevant concern. At the same time, the
complementarity regime also recognizes that "local concern" provides conditional
priority only since it can be suspended if the local jurisdiction is unable or
unwilling to prosecute. Thus, although the local connection with the crime may be
an important jurisdictional link, it is by no means an indispensable prerequisite.
Fourth, when the complementarity principle of the Rome Statute leaves
conditional priority to the territorial state, this, once more, is less for paying
consideration to the "local concern" but rather, as also indicated by Fletcher, 0 3 for
respecting the sovereignty interests of the member states.
Fifth, despite the conditional priority given to the national jurisdictions, the
complementary jurisdiction of the ICC would not be comprehended in its full
potential if understood, as still mostly done, as merely auxiliary in terms of
providing nothing more than a subordinate substitute. This flat approach, which
Fletcher seems to adopt, does not pay due attention to the so-called "competence-
competence" of the ICC. According to this role, in cases of dispute on whether a
national jurisdiction is unable or unwilling genuinely to prosecute, the ICC has the
final word."°4  This means that the ultimate responsibility for prosecuting
international crimes is with the supranational jurisdiction. Certainly, this vision of
a "global justice," realized in division of labor by the national jurisdictions in
complementarity with the ICC, could have been better expressed in the Rome
Statute by granting the ICC full universality for international crimes rather than
restricting its jurisdiction to crimes committed in a member state or by nationals
102. Rome Statute art. 17(1)(a).
103. Fletcher, supra n. 1, at 582.
104. Albin Eser, Towards an International Criminal Court: Genesis and Main Features of the Rome
Statute, 20 U. Tasmania L. Rev. 1, 18 (2002); Eser, National Jurisdiction, supra n. 4, at 280; John T.
Holmes, The Principle of Complementarity, in The International Criminal Court: The Making of the
Rome Statute 41, 74 (Roy S. Lee ed., Kluwer L. Intl. 1999).
105. This was proposed in Rome by some delegations, particularly the German one. Elizabeth
Wilmshurst, Jurisdiction of the Court, in The International Criminal Court: The Making of the Rome
Statute 127, 132 (Roy S. Lee ed., Kluwer L. Intl. 1999). For a general discussion of the ICC's
jurisdiction, see Ruth B. Philips, The International Criminal Court Statute: Jurisdiction and
Admissibility, 10 Crim. L. Forum 61, 66-71 (1999). As to the reconcilability of such a concept with
international law, see Jordan J. Paust, The Reach of ICC Jurisdiction over Non-Signatory Nationals, 33
Vand. J. Transnatl. L. 1 (2000).
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thereof.' 6 This sectorial concession to certain sovereignty interests in favor of the
national jurisdiction does not mean, however, that the basic concept of
complementary cooperation between national and international jurisdictions with
the ICC taking the final responsibility was suspended. In this sense, by taking the
protection of universally recognized values seriously, the prosecution of
international crimes according to the principle of universality is not merely a right
as it may be claimed when proceeding on the basis of territory or nationality of the
defendant or victim, but an obligation to the world community. In other words, in
the case of international crimes, national criminal justice proceeding according to
the principle of universality functions basically at the silent behest of "global
justice."' 7
To be sure, however, this search for global justice must not necessarily be
interpreted as one-sidedly only working against the defendant; for, as the ne bis in
idem exception of Article 20(3)(b) of the Rome Statute suggests to be interpreted,
the ICC may not only step in and retry the case if the defendant was unduly
acquitted, but also if he was convicted in a trial which was "not conducted
independently or impartially in accordance with the norms of due process
recognized by international law." Thus the ICC can also become active in favor of
the accused when he was the victim of partisan justice.' °8 Fairness as part of
justice-this maxim is no less valid in global dimensions.
VIII. "TAMING" UNIVERSAL JURISDICTON
No principle is without exceptions. This also applies to universal
jurisdiction. Since my first aim was to refute Fletcher's antagonism against
universal jurisdiction, my principal plea in its favor could have appeared as
unconditional. This, however, would be a wrong conclusion, for as it cannot be
ignored, and as was warned by Fletcher as well,'19 parallel assumption of universal
jurisdiction by national courts for the same crime can lead to an overlapping of
concurrent national jurisdictions with the risk of international conflicts.t ' ° As
these problems cannot be dealt with here in due depth,"' at least a few ways may
be indicated in which exaggerations of universal jurisdiction by national courts
could be "tamed."
106. Rome Statute art. 12. Eser, supra n. 104, at 13.
107. Albin Eser, Auf dem Weg zu einem internationalen Strafgerichtshof" Entstehung und Grundziige
des Rom-Statuts, 139 Zeitschrift des Bernischen Juristenvereins 1, 26 (2003). For an even further
reaching "social function" of international criminal justice in terms of conflict regulation, prevention,
documentation, and victims protection, see Frank Neubacher, Tribunal der Vernunft oder hilfloser
Versuch einer Verrechtlichung? - Acht Thesen zum stdndigen Internationalen Strafgerichtshof, 39 Recht
und Politik 160, 167 (2003).
108. Van den Wyngaert & Ongena, supra n. 50, at 725.
109. Fletcher, supra n. 1, at 583.
110. Albin Eser, Current Perspectives of Transnational Criminal Law, in Rechtsraum Europa/The
European Area of Justice: Perspectives for Harmonisation 53, 59 (Bundesministeriums der Justiz ed.,
Berline 2002).
111. For more details, see Eser, Harmonisierte Universalitat, supra n. 4; Eser, supra n. 110, at 64.
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First, national lawmakers should be cautious with extending their domestic
law onto extraterritorial crimes. As concerning universal jurisdiction, this
principle should only be employed for the protection of legal interests, which are
virtually universally recognized, as is the case with international crimes covered by
the Rome Statute or similar international treaties.
1 12
Second, even after the catalogue of crimes to be subjected to universal
jurisdiction has been limited to accomplish the protection of truly universal values,
the exercise of universal jurisdiction can still be restricted by further conditions.
This restriction can be preformed in two different ways once one acknowledges
the fundamental difference between the punishability of extraterritorial crimes
according to substantive criminal national law and the procedural admissibility of
prosecuting said crimes:
13
On the first way, one can limit the applicability of substantive criminal law
on extraterritorial crimes by making it dependent on, for example, the residence
or apprehension of the defendant within the territory. This type of "conditional
universal jurisdiction" can, for instance, be found in Austria, France, and
Switzerland.!
1 4
On the other way, in terms of "absolute universal jurisdiction""' on the level
of substantive criminal law, a country could very well declare international crimes
punishable according to national law without regard to where they have been
committed, and yet on the procedural level require further conditions-such as
residence or apprehension of the defendant on national territory-in order to
start a prosecution. This limitation of universal jurisdiction by procedural means
has recently been adopted by Germany.1 6 After my reasoning before, it should
not come as a surprise that I would favor this way.
112. In this respect, the German catalogue of the "Weltrechts(pflege)prinzip" in Section 6 Penal
Code certainly goes much too far, in particular with regard to drug crimes, as ocassionally rightly
criticized by Fletcher.
113. There are two different sides of the same coin, which common law merges in the term
"jurisdiction," see Blakesley, supra n. 10, at 36, and which are unfortunately not disentangled in Article
5 of the Rome Statute either. As to details about the conceptual differences, which are not completely
identical with the common law distinction between jurisdiction "to proscribe" and "to adjudicate," see
Eser, Harmonisierte Universalitat, supra n. 4, at 226-36. With regard to international cooperation, see
Albin Eser, Basic Issues of Transnational Cooperation in Criminal Cases: A Problem in Outline, in
Criminal Science in a Global Society: Essays in Honor of Gerhard 0. W. Mueller 3 (Edward M. Wise
ed., Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1994).
114. Cassese, supra n. 17, at 285-86.
115. Id. at 286.
116. In doing so, the German legislators explicitly revoked prior federal case law which had read into
the unconditioned application of "universal crime" (§ 6 German Penal Code) the requirement of a
"legitimate domestic nexus." See, in particular, the landmark decision of the Federal Supreme Court,
in 45 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofs in Strafsachen 65 (BGHSt 1999). For details and
criticism, see Albin Eser, VOlkermord und deutsche Strafgewalt: Zum Spannungsverhaltnis von
Weltrechtsprinzip und legitimierendem Inlandsbezug, in Strafverfahrensrecht in Theorie und Praxis:
Festschrift fPr Lutz Meyer-Gossner zum 65. Geburtstag 3 (Albin Eser et al. eds., Verlag C.H. Beck
2001); Eser, National Jurisdiction, supra n. 4, at 281-83. For details regarding the new German
legislation, but without discussion of the procedural restrictions on the exercise of universal jurisdiction
according to § 153f Criminal Procedure Code, see Helmut Satzger, German Criminal Law and the
Rome Statute - A Critical Analysis of the New German Code of Crimes against International Law, 2
Intl. Crim. L. Rev. 261, 279-80 (2002). For a broad substantive approach, including procedural
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Third, because concurrence of national jurisdictions cannot be avoided even
in cases of "classical" connections by way of territoriality or nationality of the
offender or victim, " 7  the previously mentioned limitations on universal
jurisdiction will eventually not suffice to prevent conflicts between concurrent
jurisdictions. So, in addition to internal national limitations of extraterritorial
jurisdiction, special rules of conflict on the level of international cooperation will
be needed-as, for instance, suggested by the Freiburg Proposal on Concurrent
Jurisdictions." " Interestingly enough, the idea of clearing competitions between
different jurisdictions by way of international cooperation is not foreign to
Fletcher either: when he asks for "negotiations" when two countries claim
jurisdiction over a criminal on the basis of (supposedly) "classical" connections of
territoriality or nationality, " 9 why should this not provide a general model for
solving concurrence on universal jurisdiction as well?
IX. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
I do hope that this argument with George Fletcher was not too unfriendly.
For many years we have known that in the academic search for truth and justice,
frankness rather than friendliness must be suprema lex. As he himself does not
shy away from provoking others if he deems necessary, I am confident that he will
appreciate my candor as a sincere expression of friendship.
At any rate, even where I had to disagree, his differing views forced me to
rethink my own position-in the spirit of "rethinking criminal law" as he most
impressively demonstrated in his world-renowned epoch-making treatise of more
than a quarter of a century ago.2  So, as with his plea against universal
jurisdiction, he aimed "to overcome the breakdown of reasoned argument on this
issue,'' 2 challenging adversaries "to provide good reasons for their position,' ' 22 at
least for myself I find my plea for universal jurisdiction more reasoned now than
before.
restrictions, see Gerhard Werle & Florian JeBberger, Das Viilkerstrafgesetzbuch, 57 JuristenZeitung
725, 732 (2002).
117. Seesupra pt. II & nn. 11-15.
118. Freiburg Proposal, supra n. 84, at 9-10, §§ 1-5. As to another way to web a comprehensive net
of national jurisdictions, see The Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction (Stephen Macedo ed.,
Program in L. & Pub. Affairs of Princeton U. 2001) (available at <http:l/www.princeton.edu/-lapa/
unive-jur.pdf>; and Monica Hans, Providing for Uniformity in the Exercise of Universal Jurisdiction:
Can Either the Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction or an International Criminal Court
Accomplish this Goal?, 15 Transnatl. Law. 357, 392-96 (2002). For more details on the concurrence and
harmonization of national proceedings in exercise of universal jurisdiction, see Eser, Harmonisierte
Universalitat, supra n. 4.
119. Fletcher, supra n. 1, at 583.
120. George P. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (Little, Brown & Co. 1978).
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